Archive

Creating the post-2008 global safety net for mega-banks

The study seeks to explain why the instruments of central banking inevitably break down over time.

Using a unique dataset provided by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), we document a direct channel through which financial institutions contribute to the net worth of members of the U.S. Congress, particularly those sitting on the finance committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives.

This paper applies Schein’s model of organizational culture to financial firms and their prudential regulators.

As the financial economy has expanded beginning in the mid-1980s, it has done so in part by selling more products to individuals and households.

Inspired by the Coasean “market vs firm” dichotomy, we offer a new definition of efficiency by applying the notions of network cost and network efficiency as developed in complex network theory.

We analyze shareholders’ incentives to change the leverage of a firm that has already borrowed substantially. As a result of debt overhang, shareholders have incentives to resist reductions in leverage that make the remaining debt safer.