In this seven-part series, Professor James Boyce delivers a deep, thought-provoking analysis of a topic often ignored or labeled as “non-economic” by mainstream economists. The series opens with a historical exploration of both successes and failures in using economics to end wars and sustain peace. Boyce then delves into the complex interplay of greed and grievances in civil wars, drawing from his first-hand experience in post-war El Salvador in the 1990s.
Throughout the series, Boyce critiques conventional economic wisdom, particularly in areas such as efficiency, debt, tariffs, and the taxation of foreign aid in countries transitioning from war to peace. In the concluding episodes, he highlights the critical challenges and dilemmas economists must confront to address the enormous costs of war. Boyce argues that only by reimagining its role and shedding ideological biases can economic theory truly help humanity understand how to invest in lasting peace.
EPISODE 1
Why Care About Wars?
Professor Boyce highlights why too many economists think war and peace are not an “economic” problem.
Traditionally, the arguments are, “If you want to study war, then talk to a political scientist,” or “If economists get markets and the economy to work efficiently, then the chances of social unrest that leads to war decrease, and peace is more likely to be achieved.” Boyce challenges this conventional wisdom by highlighting three key costs of war: human costs, financial costs, and environmental costs. He argues that when we recognize the enormous stakes, it is clear why economists should analyze war and peace. To illustrate how economists can engage in this terrain, he discusses his experience in El Salvador after the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords that ended the country's civil war.
Suggested Reading List
Brown University, Costs of War Project, “Teaching the Costs of War.” Multimedia resources online athttps://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/teaching.
A. Khorram-Manesh et al., Estimating the number of civilian casualties in modern armed conflicts – a systematic review,’ Frontiers in Public Health, 2021.
KPMG, Post-war Reconstruction of Economy: Case Studies. 2022. [pdf here]
Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, “Obstacles to Peacebuilding,” Foreign Policy, March 1994.
James K. Boyce, ed., Economic Policy for Building Peace: The Lessons of El Salvador, 1996.
Guide | Timestamp | ||
Intro | 0–1:12 | ||
The Costs of War | 1:20 - 6:18 | ||
Human Costs | |||
Global Combat Deaths | 1946-2008: PRIO 2009-2022: WB | ||
Major Military Mortality | Khorram-Manesh et al., 2021 | ||
Burden on Children | Daily Mail 2015 | ||
Financial Costs | |||
Photo | Mostar 1994 | ||
Direct and Indirect Costs of War | KPMG 2022 | ||
U.S. Post-9/11 War Spending | Brown 2021 | ||
Environmental Costs | |||
Military Greenhouse Gases | Brown 2019 | ||
Kuwait | National News 2021 | 4:00 | |
Oil Field Fires | 4:04 | ||
Landmines | 4:17 | ||
Zimbabwe Unexploded Bombs | ADF 2022 | 4:38 | |
Vietnam - Agent Orange - Natural Spring | NYT 1974 NYT 2014 | 5:00 | |
|
Lessons from El Salvador 1979-91 | 6:19-13:21 | ||
Civil War | Center for Justice and Accountability | 6:36 | |
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) | American Archive of Public Broadcasting | 7:17 | |
Farabundo Marí | Oxford | 7:31 | |
14 Families | LA Times | 7:43 | |
Chapultepec Peace Accords, Mexico City | Notre Dame | 8:55 | |
Outcomes of Peace Accords |
| 9:49-10:14 | |
El Salvador Report | Adjustment toward peace: An introduction | Boyce, World Development, 1995 | 11:33 |
1993: A New Approach | 13:21-End | ||
Álavaro De Soto | International Center for Transitional Justice | 13:32 | |
Graciana Del Castillo | Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs | 13:41 | |
Obstacles to Peacebuilding | Foreign Policy | 13:47 | |
| Implementation of peace accords and economic policy needed to be harmonized. | 15:15 | |
Adjustment Towards Peace Project | 15:42 | ||
Key Takes Aways | Conventional macro policies failed to take into account the cost of peace agreements. | 16:39 | |
El Salvador very reluctantly agreed to fund peace process programs. | 18:17 | ||
World Bank & IMF support was not conditional on funding peace. | 20:05 | ||
